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Sattler: Sattler: Eyes in the Sky
THE SKY,
EYES IN
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
AGE OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
On May 19, 1986, the United States Supreme Court handed down two
decisions limiting the constitutional right to be free from aerial surveillance.
The first decision, California v. Ciraolo,' dealt with a private residence;
the second, Dow Chemical v. United States,2 involved aerial surveillance
of a commercial enterprise. Both of the decisions upheld the government's
use of aerial surveillance in situations which previously would have been
considered to be constitutionally prohibited searches. In California v. Ciraolo,3 the Santa Clara, California, police received an anonymous tip that
marijuana plants were present in respondent's backyard. The yard was
surrounded by two fences, a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence.
These fences prevented ground-level observation of the respondent's yard.
Police officers, who were experienced in marijuana identification, obtained
the use of a small plane and flew over respondent's house at an altitude
of 1,000 feet, 4 identifying marijuana plants growing in the yard.' A search
warrant was obtained on the strength of the officer's observations. The
warrant was executed and marijuana plants seized. Respondent pled guilty
court refused to grant his motion
to cultivation of marijuana when the trial
6
to suppress the evidence of the search.
The trial court was reversed by the California Court of Appeals on
the ground that the warrantless aerial surveillance of respondent's backyard
was a violation of respondent's fourth amendment rights. 7 The California
Court of Appeals held that respondent's marijuana was within the curtilage
of his home, and therefore the marijuana was within an area where respondent's expectation of privacy is recognized by society. The court reached
its conclusion by holding that the existence of the two fences was sufficient
1. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986), rev'g 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93
(1984).
2. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), aff'g 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
3. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
4. Federal regulations require aircraft to be at least 500 feet above the ground
at all times when not in the process of landing or taking off, and at least 1,000 feet
above the nearest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft
when in "congested" areas. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(b), (c) (1986). Helicopters have no
fixed minimum height, the only requirement being that they must be operated without
hazard to person or property. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(d) (1986).
5. 106 S. Ct. at 1810-11.
6. Id. at 1811.
7. 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984).
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evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy.' The California court also
considered it significant that the surveillance of respondent's backyard was
the result of focused observation, directed only at his yard, and was not
the result of "a routine patrol conducted for any other legitimate law
enforcement or public safety [reason]. .

denied the state's petition for review.' 0

. ."9 The

California Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court reversed the California court." The
Supreme Court invoked the two-part test first enunciated in Katz v. United
States. 2 The first consideration of the Katz test is whether there is evidence
of a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched; the second
consideration is whether society is willing to recognize that expectation of
privacy as one which is reasonable. 13
Addressing the issue of whether respondent had exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy, the Court agreed with the California Court of Appeals that respondent had clearly met the test of exhibiting a subjective
expectation of privacy, but the Court qualified its finding with the phrase,
...
14
"So far as the normal sidewalk traffic was concerned.
The Court then addressed the second portion of the Katz analysis,
whether respondent's expectation of privacy is one that society is willing
to recognize as reasonable. In addressing the issue of reasonableness, the
Court first noted that the area in question was certainly within the curtilage
of respondent's home, but the Court noted that even that area is not protected from all forms of observation. 5 The Court stated, "What a person
8. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
9.

161 Cal. App. 3d at 1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.

10.

106 S. Ct. at 1811.

11.
12.

Id.at 1813.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).

13. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. 106 S.Ct. at 1812. This may be an indication that the Court would not
have found a subjective expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance without actual
efforts to screen the yard from aerial observation. The Court noted, "Whether respondent therefore manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard, or whether instead he manifested merely a hope that no one
would observe his unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these circumstances." Id.
15. Id. This raises the issue of the "open view" doctrine, which states that
what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject to fourth amendment
protection. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection."). Under the analysis presented in Katz, there would
be a lack of an actual, subjective expectation of privacy by failing to take measures
to conceal the activities from the public view; and a lack of a "reasonable" expectation of privacy, since the activities were exposed to the public.
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own home or office, is not a
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
16
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
Where the Supreme Court disagreed with the California Court of Appeals was on the issue of whether respondent had knowingly exposed the
curtilage of his home to the public, as described in Katz.' 7 The California
court had taken the position that there was a difference between exposing
one's property to the chance of observation by public flights or routine
police patrols and the surveillance of one's property by focused surveillance.' 8 The Supreme Court refused to recognize this distinction, finding
that navigable airspace is open to the public and that any member of the
public could have done exactly what the police officers did. Therefore,
respondent's expectation of privacy was unreasonable and not one that
society was prepared to honor.19 The Supreme Court considered navigable
airspace to be comparable to a public highway, treating it as a lawful
vantage point from which police officers could observe activities on the
20
ground.
Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, which stated,"The Fourth
Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible
to the naked eye." ' 2' Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. 22 The dissenting opinion questions the majority's conclusion that simply because airspace is open to the
public there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation. 23 The dissenting opinion quoted Oliver v. United States24 as holding that one consideration in determining the legitimacy of an expectation
of privacy is "our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion.''25
The dissenting opinion noted that one's home has traditionally been
the most protected area, where there is virtually always a legitimate expectation of privacy, 26 and that the curtilage has traditionally been treated as
part of the home. 27
16.
(1967)).
17.
18.

106 S. Ct. at 1812 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (1984).

19.
20.

106 S. Ct. at 1813.
Id.

21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at
Id.
Oliver
Id. at
106 S.

1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
178.
Ct. at 1816 (Powell, J., dissenting). See United States v. Karo, 468
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The dissenting opinion broke from the majority opinion on the question of whether persons exposing their homes to observation by public air
travelers sacrifice any reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance, including purposeful aerial observation aimed at a particular target.28 The dissent believed that while it may be true that there is a risk of
observation from aircraft, in general the possibility of someone on a typical
commercial or private aircraft observing private activities on the ground
and connecting them with a particular person is so small as to be "virtually
nonexistent. ' 29 The dissent noted that while it is true that activities within
the curtilage may be exposed to observation from the air, the public is not
there for that purpose, creating a qualitative difference between public use
of the airways and intentional surveillance from the air, a difference that
the majority opinion refused to recognize. 0 Since the dissent would find a
reasonable expectation of privacy from intentional aerial surveillance in
respondent's yard, they would affirm the California Court of Appeals in
suppressing the evidence obtained as being the result of an illegal search
and seizure.31
On the same day it decided Californiav. Ciraolo,32 the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Dow Chemical v. United States.33 This case
involved the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) use of aerial photography to observe the interior of Dow's 2,000 acre manufacturing complex in Midland, Michigan.3 4 Dow also involved questions of whether the
EPA was authorized to conduct aerial surveillance 3 and whether Dow was
protected by trade secrets laws, 3 6 but only the aerial surveillance issues will
be discussed in this Note.
U.S. 705 (1984) (warrantless use of electronic tracking device in house ruled unconstitutional: "Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unconstitutional." 468 U.S. at 714-15); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961) (small microphone touched heating duct of defendant's house; smallest physical
intrusion ruled unconstitutional).
27. 106 S.Ct. at 1816 (Powell, J., dissenting); see, e.g., United States v.Roberts, 747 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (reaffirmed the concept of curtilage as the
determining factor in deciding whether a fourth amendment search had taken place);
National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp.
945 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (fourth amendment protection did not extend to open fields,
but curtilage was protected).
28. 106 S.Ct. at 1817-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1818.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1819.
32. 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986).
33. 106 S.Ct. 1819 (1986), aff'g 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 1822-23.
35. Id. at 1823-24.
36. Id. at 1823.
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The EPA had been engaged in a longstanding dispute with Dow over
emissions from generators located in the complex. 37 When the EPA requested an on-site inspection in early 1978, Dow refused on the ground
that the EPA intended to photograph portions of the plant and Dow was
concerned about the possible loss of trade secrets. 38 Rather than seek an
administrative search warrant, the EPA arranged for a private aerial photography firm to take photographs of the site. 39 The plane used by the firm
made several passes over Dow's plant, staying within navigable airspace at
all times and taking photographs from various altitudes. 40 The equipment
used to take the photographs was a $22,000 aerial mapping camera, de' 41
scribed as the "finest precision aerial camera available." After learning
of the photography from the firm hired by the EPA, Dow brought suit in
the district court to prevent further aerial photography and to prevent them
42
from disseminating, releasing or copying the photographs already taken.
The trial court found that Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the plant area because of its extensive security measures. 43 Finding a reasonable expectation of privacy, and subjective manifestations of this expectation, the trial court found in favor of Dow. 44
45
The decision of the trial court was reversed by the court of appeals.
The court of appeals found that while Dow had an expectation of privacy
from ground-level searches, it had failed to protect itself from aerial searches.
The court of appeals further held that the concept of curtilage does not
are more
apply to large industrial complexes, holding that these complexes
46
like "open fields" as described in Oliver v. United States.
In examining the fourth amendment implications of this case, the Supreme Court first determined whether the concept of curtilage could be
applied to a large industrial complex such as Dow's, and if the area was
protected by the fourth amendment, whether the use of the sophisticated
aerial photography equipment was permissible. 47 In considering the question
37. Big Brother Strikes Again, FoRms, May 12, 1980, at 51.
38. 106 S.Ct. at 1822.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 4.
41. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1367 (E.D. Mich.
1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
42. Id. at 1356.
43. Dow had built an eight-foot high fence around the entire property, had
motion detectors around the complex to detect intruders, a complete ban on cameras
at all times in the complex and a normal security force of fifty people on duty at all
times. In addition, the sensitive areas were placed near the center of the 2,000 acre
complex and surrounded with buildings to screen them from sight. Id. at 1364-65.
44. Id. at 1375.
45. 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S.Ct. 1819 (1986).
46. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
47. 106 S.Ct. at 1825.
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of whether the concept of "industrial curtilage" is valid, the Court limited
its discussion to whether or not areas within the "industrial curtilage" are
protected from aerial observation by the fourth amendment. 48 The Court
found that the compelling reasons for protecting the area surrounding a
private home from surveillance are not present in a case involving a commercial complex, and that these Complexes are more analogous to "open
fields" than they are to the curtilage of a private dwelling. 49 Since it is well
established that "open fields" may constitutionally be subjected to government searches by means of aerial surveillance, 50 the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' finding that the EPA's use of aerial surveillance
5
was constitutionally permissible in this situation. '
Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun. In their dissenting opinion, the Justices disagreed
with the majority's decision that Dow had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the interior of their manufacturing complex because it more
closely resembled an "open field" than the curtilage of a private home.2
In their opinion, the complex resembled neither, and should have been dealt
with on its own merits rather than trying to pigeonhole it into unsuitable
categories. 53 According to the dissent, the majority attempted to describe
Dow's complex as an "open field," but also found that Dow did enjoy a
constitutional right to privacy from ground-level searches in the same area.
Under previous analyses, once an area was categorized as an "open field,"
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy either from aerial or ground
searches. In addition, the dissent felt the majority's position was mistaken
in reasoning that the use of an aerial mapping camera presented no con54
stitutional problems because it was only an enhancement of human vision.
48. The Court failed to address the issue of whether these areas are protected
from ground-level observation. Id.
49. Id. at 1826-27.
50. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), where the Court held
that, as a matter of law, there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy in an area
categorized as an "open field."
51. As for the issue of whether the use of an aerial mapping camera created
any complications, the Court found that the camera merely enhanced human eyesight
and raised no constitutional problems. 106 S.Ct. at 1827; see generally cases cited
infra note 54.
52. 106 S. Ct. at 1830.
53. Id.at 1833.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (use of telescope to
observe the interior of an apartment was unconstitutional without a warrant); People
v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (use of helicopter to observe
marijuana plants otherwise concealed not allowed). But see United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978) (allowed use of "[b]inoculars, dogs that
track and sniff out contraband, search-lights, fluorescent powders, automobiles and
airplanes, burglar alarms, radar devices, and bait money. . . ."); United States v.

Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977) (allowed use of "helicopter, binoculars,
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The dissent would find that Dow was entitled to a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the interior of their manufacturing complex, and that the use
of sophisticated aerial photography was an illegal search when done without
a warrant.s5 In order to understand the effects of these decisions on the
law, it is helpful to first trace the evolution of fourth amendment analysis.
Before the decision in Katz v. United States,56 the determination of whether
fourth amendment protection was available was made primarily on the basis
of "constitutionally protected areas. '57 This analysis was structured in terms
of property law, because it was based on the language of the Constitution
which protected "persons, houses, papers and effects." 58 Therefore, fourth
amendment protection was dependent upon a physical trespass of a constitutionally protected area.5 9 During this period, the curtilage was recognized as being the area surrounding the house, in which private activities
took place, and was regarded as being a portion of the house itself.6 0
Therefore, prior to Katz, the curtilage was a "constitutionally protected
area" and any trespass onto the curtilage was a violation of fourth amendment protection.6 1 Katz v. United States 2 was a turning point in fourth
amendment analysis. The Court in Katz held that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.," 63 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, which
radar, or the like"); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (aids such
as flashlights or binoculars allowed).
55. 106 S. Ct. at 1834. The dissent would apply the Katz analysis and find
that Dow had exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and that society
was willing to recognize that expectation as being legitimate.
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967) (attorney's office
protected); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (use of listening
device to hear through wall constitutional since no physical trespass occurred); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (wiretapping constitutional if done
without trespass to property).
58. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend IV.

59. See supra note 55.
60. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
61. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957) (warrantless search of chicken house constitutional because chicken house not within
curtilage); Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955) (warrantless search
of barn not constitutional because barn was within the curtilage).
62. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz involved governmental eavesdropping on a
conversation taking place in a public telephone booth. The parties framed the case
in terms of whether the phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area," but
the court rejected that analysis, choosing instead to announce a new line of analysis.
63. Id. at 351.
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has been adopted by succeeding courts, laid out a test involving two inquiries. First, a court is to decide whether the person involved had exhibited
"an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," and second, the court must
decide whether society is willing to recognize that expectation of privacy
as one that is reasonable. 4 This analysis led the courts away from the
property concepts focused on earlier, and concentrated their analysis instead
on the acts of the individual and society's attitudes towards those acts.
Many courts began to dismiss the concept of curtilage as being either an65
tiquated or unduly conclusory.
The next major step in analyzing fourth amendment protection of the
curtilage occurred in Oliver v. United States.6 Oliver did not overturn the
analysis presented in Katz, but added another step to it. The Court in Oliver
once again looked to the language of the fourth amendment to describe
the limits of constitutional protection, finding that the "reasonable" expectation of privacy described in Katz could only be found in one's "person, houses, papers, and effects." 67 The Court held that if the area involved
was not within the curtilage, then, as a matter of law, there could be no
legitimate expectation of privacy and therefore, no fourth amendment protection. 68 This introduced a threshold determination. A court must decide
that the area involved is within the curtilage before it would be allowed to
64. Id. at 361.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 855 n.7 (9th Cir.
1986) ("The post-Katz extension of Fourth Amendment protection reflects Katz
'teaching that determination of these questions turns on the degree of privacy which
the individual is seeking to preserve, rather than upon resort to the 'ancient concept
of curtilage."'); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149
(1973) ("We do not believe ... that since the advent of the [Katz] 'reasonableness'
test .. .answers can be found in a Procrustean application of these [open fields
versus curtilage] doctrinaire pronouncements").
66. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). This case involved a warrantless search of a field
after police officers, acting on a tip, drove past appellant's house and passed through
a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. Id. at 173. The officers entered appellant's property and found marijuana plants growing in a field over a mile from his
home. Id. Appellant was arrested for their cultivation. Id. The district court suppressed the marijuana, applying the test described in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), and finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
based on the "No Trespassing" signs, the fencing of the field and the secluded
location of the marijuana plants which caused the field to not fall within the "open
field" exception to the fourth amendment. Id. at 173-74. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the open fields doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924), which allows police officers to enter and search fields outside the curtilage,
was not superseded by the holding in Katz. Id. at 174. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the test described in Katz simply
did not come into effect if the area in question was outside the curtilage. Id. at 18081.
67. 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984).
68. Id. at 180.
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consider whether there had been a subjective expectation of privacy and,
if so, whether that expectation was one society is prepared to recognize as
69
being legitimate.
The courts have had a great deal of difficulty dealing with the issue
of aerial surveillance within the framework of Oliver and Katz.'0 As noted
in Katz, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." ' 7 Today, with increasing air traffic of all kinds, is all outdoor activity knowingly
exposed to observation from the sky? The courts which have had to deal
with this issue have used a number of different analyses in an attempt to
2
answer this question.'
When examining the requirement of a subjective expectation of privacy,
courts have basically used two approaches. The first considers whether the
party has attempted to make his activities secure from ground-level observation. 73 If the party has made his activities secure from observation from
the ground, he has satisfied the requirement of a subjective expectation of
privacy. This was the approach used by the California Court of Appeals
4
in California v. Ciraolo.7
The California court found that by erecting two
fences, one of which was ten feet high, Ciraolo exhibited an expectation
of privacy. 75 The second approach courts have taken looks to whether the
69. Id. at 178-80.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1984) (aerial
surveillance of commercial premises upheld); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373
(9th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Cal.
1985), rev'd, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) (warrantless aerial surveillance of interior
of greenhouse constitutional); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974) (warrantless helicopter surveillance upheld); Dean v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973) (same). But see National Org.
for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (law enforcement officials engaged in program of aerial surveillance enjoined
from approaching within 500 feet of the curtilage of any home); People v. Sneed,
32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (use of helicopter for surveillance
"unreasonable governmental intrusion"); People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 499, 710 P.2d 299 (1985) (state constitution prohibits warrantless aerial surveillance of residential yard shielded from ground level view). See generally Comment,
Aerial Surveillance: A Plane View of the FourthAmendment, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 307
(1983); Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains
for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 725 (1985).
71. 389 U.S. at 351.
72. See generally Note, supra note 70.
73. See, e.g., State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1985) (court should focus on whether defendant has taken steps to protect his
privacy from ground-level observation); People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 499, 710 P.2d 299 (1985) (shielding of yard from ground-level observation gives
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance).
74. 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984).
75. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1089; 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
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party has attempted to conceal his activities from observation from the
air.7 6 This second standard is far more rigorous and one that few parties
would be able to meet, particularly if they wished to preserve their yards
as outdoor areas. After determining that there is a subjective expectation
of privacy under either of the above tests, a court prior to Dow and Ciraolo
would then address the issue of whether the party's expectation of privacy
was one that society was willing to recognize as being legitimate. 77 Prior to
the present case, there have been two basic approaches to answering this
question. The first examines the reasonableness of the aerial surveillance,
examining a number of factors to reach a decision.7 8 The second group of
cases came from courts that viewed aerial surveillance as considerably more
of a threat to privacy. These courts found that the warrantless use of aerial
79
surveillance was unreasonable as a matter of law.
Again, this was the approach taken by the California Court of Appeals
in Ciraolo. 0 There, the court found that warrantless aerial surveillance of
the curtilage was unconstitutional due to the special concern with which
76. See, e.g., United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) (police
observed marijuana plants through translucent greenhouse); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw.
412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
77. See, e.g., discussion in United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th
Cir. 1980) (no reasonable expectation of privacy due to location near sea-coast and
presence of routine over-flights).
78. Some of the factors considered include whether the surveillance was conducted from a height in compliance with regulations setting minimum heights for
planes, whether planes commonly flew over the area, the duration of the surveillance,
and whether equipment was used to enhance the senses of the observers, such as
telescopes or cameras. See supra note 4; see, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d
1373 (9th Cir. 1980) (Coast Guard flights were routine over area, and objects observed
were buildings) (discounting use of telephoto lens); National Org. for Reform of
Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (aerial
surveillance enjoined due to repeated observation from extremely low altitudes, use
of helicopters to look through windows of homes, harassment of people on the
ground); People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1984) (used
federal aviation regulations to determine lawfulness of overflight).
79. Although not explicitly holding to this rule, in State v. Fierge, 673 S.W.2d
855 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), the Eastern District Court of Appeals addressed the issue
of aerial surveillance and found that "[i]f we find that the patch is within the curtilage,
then fourth amendment protections should be invoked." Id. at 856. This would seem
to indicate that the Court would not have allowed warrantless aerial surveillance of
the curtilage. However, the court found that the curtilage was defined by the outer
walls of the outbuildings and in this case the marijuana plants in question were
growing against the outer wall of an outbuilding, placing them just outside of the
curtilage and into the area of "open fields," where there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 856-57. This case demonstrates the problem with the mechanical application of rules. Had the plants been only a few feet away, growing
against the side wall of the outbuilding, they would have been within the curtilage,
and, presumably, protected from aerial surveillance. Id. at 856.
80. 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984).
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the law protects the sanctity of the home. 81 In its decision in Ciraolo,8 2 the
Supreme Court seems to have adopted the first line of reasoning, examining
the reasonableness of the surveillance, and goes even further by saying that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy from naked-eye aerial surveillance from navigable airspace; that is, surveillance done without physical
trespass. The Court did note that there may be circumstances where the
technology became so intrusive as to raise fourth amendment considerations, but failed to give any examples of what might be prohibited.83
In addition, the Court seems to be making a distinction between commercial property and residential property, holding that residential property
may be entitled to greater protection from aerial surveillance than commercial property.8 4 The impression left from these cases is that more sophisticated forms of surveillance will be permitted when directed towards
commercial property than when directed towards residential property. 5 In
both Dow and Ciraolo, the Court resurrected an issue that had long been
thought put to rest by placing emphasis on the fact that the EPA conducted
its surveillance with no physical trespass.8 6 It had seemed that the Court in
Kat 8 7 had answered the question of the necessity of a physical trespass
once and for all, but now the Court is again placing emphasis on the nonoccurrence of a physical trespass. As Justice Stewart noted in the majority
81. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97; see also People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App.
3d 1169, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1984) (reasonable expectation of privacy in curtilage
extends to aerial surveillance).
82. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
83. 106 S. Ct. at 1814 n.3. The Court cited the petitioner's brief as saying
"[a]erial observation of curtilage may become invasive, either due to physical intrusiveness or through modern technology which discloses to the senses those intimate
associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens."
Brief for Petitioner 14-15. Note, however, that a sophisticated aerial mapping camera
mounted in a specially modified airplane does not fall into this category, at least
when used to observe commercial property. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). In Dow, the Court did note that the use of something as
sophisticated as satellite technology might be prohibited without a warrant. 106 S.
Ct. at 1826.
84. The Court noted "[w]e find it important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened."
106 S. Ct. at 1826 n.4.
85. In Dow, the Court quoted with approval Donovan v. Dewery, 452 U.S.
594, 598-99 (1981), as saying that the government has "greater latitude to conduct
warrantless inspections of commercial property [because] the expectation of privacy
that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly
from the sanctity accorded an individual's home." 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
86. "The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took place
in public navigable airspace ... in a physically nonintrusive manner." 106 S. Ct. at
1813 (citation omitted). "Any actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed area
would raise significantly different questions. . . ." 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
87. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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opinion in Katz, the protection provided by the fourth amendment would
be of little consequence in an era of electronic and optical sophistication
if its protection "turn[ed] upon the presence or absence of a physical in88
trusion into any given enclosure."
The Court did attempt to retreat from the physical trespass theory to
some extent by saying that "surveillance of private property by using highly
sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public,
such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a
warrant." 89 "But," they continued, "the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns." 90 Testimony
had revealed that by enlarging the photographs, certain items as small as
one-half inch in diameter were visible.9 ' Apparently the Court felt that
because the photographs had, in fact, captured no "identifiable human
faces or secret documents," there had been no violation of privacy. 92 However, Dow was not attempting to protect the faces of their employees, or
documents, they were attempting to protect their manufacturing processes,
which could be determined from an analysis of the photographs.93 The
Court is risking the gradual decay of fourth amendment protection through
technological advances that the dissenting opinion in Dow warned off4 by
focusing on the technological sophistication of the surveillance devices, and
their availability to the public. A few years from now we could have observation by the use of "conventional" orbiting infra-red or gamma-ray
detectors, which, if not particularly advanced for their era, would be acceptable by this standard. 95 Another issue raised by the standard presented
in this case of acceptability of surveillance technology being dependent on
its availability to the public is the fact that the fourth amendment was not
intended to protect against surveillance by other members of the public,
88. Id. at 353.
89. 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
90. Id. at 1826-27.
91. 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982). In the majority opinion, the
Supreme Court attempted to discount the detail revealed by the photos by noting
that details of this size were only visible due to contrast against the snow on the
ground at the time, noting that there were no "identifiable human faces or secret
documents captured ...." 106 S.Ct. at 1827 n.5.
92. 106 S. Ct. at 1827 n.5.
93. Id. at 1822.
94. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1833 (1986) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
95. In Dow, the Court placed emphasis on the fact that the means of surveillance (a $22,000 aerial photography camera permanently mounted in an airplane)
was "generally available to the public." The logical conclusion from the language
used by the court is that means of surveillance "generally available to the public"
will be acceptable. 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27; see also id. at 1833 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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but against surveillance by the government. 96 Why the public should be the
arbiter of what technology the government may use is not made clear in
the cases, and raises questions of whether the Court might have lost sight
of the focus of the fourth amendment. While people are normally concerned
with what is displayed to public view, it is not other members of the public
who threaten them with arrest and prosecution, but rather, the government.
The dangers presented by the general public are minimal compared to the
risks presented by the government learning of one's activities, hence the
fourth amendment's protection against governmental but not private searches
and seizures. 97 The use of a "public availability" standard for surveillance
technology raises the specter of the gradual deterioration of the protection
provided by the fourth amendment as increasingly sophisticated technology
becomes more commonly available.
In Katz, the Court had shifted from the traditional mechanical rules
and had focused fourth amendment analysis on the reasonableness of an
individual's expectation of privacy from surveillance.9 8 In these decisions,
the Court is once again describing a mechanical test, that whatever can be
detected from a public vantage point without physical trespass is "fair
game" unless measures are taken to shield it from prying eyes. 99 While
superficially this rule may be attractive, when examined closely there are a
number of ramifications.
The main concern is the fact that for an individual to protect his claim
to an expectation of privacy, he is required to take measures which would
have only one purpose, to shield against aerial surveillance.10 By requiring
parties to guard against particular forms of surveillance to protect their
right to privacy, the Court has seriously limited the protection offered by
the fourth amendment. For example, applying this rule to the facts in
0
Katz,°1
the Court might well have reasoned that there was no physical
trespass and that Katz had failed to take any measures to prevent his
conversations from being overheard by electronic listening devices, thus
02
abandoning his claim to an expectation of privacy in his conversations.1
The other problem with this rule is the fact that any measures to protect
oneself against aerial surveillance would be unreasonable in the light of
96.
97.
98.
99.
v. United
100.

See supra note 58.
See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1978).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986); Dow Chem. Co.
States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826-27 (1986).
See Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance:

Curtainsfor the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 725, 752-54 (1985).

101. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
102. The Court in Dow did note that one important factor was that the public
had access to the airways and to aerial photography equipment. 106 S. Ct. at 1823.
Today, there are a number of suppliers providing electronic surveillance equipment
to the general public, so there is a possibility that this too will be considered routine.
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everyday experience. While it may be convenient and simple to close doors
or pull curtains shut to maintain privacy from outside observers, it would
hardly be reasonable or feasible to enclose outdoor living areas to protect
them from observation from the air, and to do so would be to destroy their
value as outdoor areas.
In order to comply with this standard, Mr. Ciraolo would have had
to cover his backyard with an opaque shield to prevent observation, in
effect, enclosing his backyard. Dow Chemical Company would have been
forced to cover their manufacturing complex. 03 While both of these alternatives are theoretically possible, they are certainly inconsistent with the
uses the parties had in mind. A covered backyard is not a backyard at all,
it becomes merely another room in one's house.
In Katz, 041 the Court stressed that there was no place in fourth amendment analysis for mechanical rules, and that the standard should be one
of "reasonableness." In these two decisions, the Court backs away from
that standard. Rather than examining what measures would be reasonable
for an individual to take to protect his activities from police observation,
the Court returns to a mechanical test; that is, whether the defendant had
managed to shield his activities from observation from the sky. 05 Since the
103. The dissenting opinion notes that one of the main reasons for not covering
the plant, aside from enormous costs, was worker safety. The chemicals used in the
manufacturing process are highly toxic and explosive and would have been extremely
hazardous if confined inside a building. 106 S. Ct. at 1828 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
105. In United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986), decided
after Ciraolo and Dow, the court of appeals said that an attempt to conceal one's
activities from aerial observation was not sufficient; the activities must actually be
concealed. In Broadhurst, the defendant had constructed a greenhouse with metal
roofing, translucent siding and a caretaker to raise and lower screens over the side
of the building. Id. at 854. The police officers testified that they were able to observe
"shadows, shapes of plants, and shades of green.. . 'consistent with marijuana."'
Id. at 850. The court of appeals held that they had observed what any member of
the public could have seen by flying over defendant's property, and therefore, there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 856. The court made the following
observation: "The Constitution does not require one to build an opaque bubble over
himself to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy. Where the bubble he builds,
however, allows persons in navigable public airspace to view his illicit activity, whatever expectation of privacy he has is certainly not reasonable." Id. at 856 (citations
omitted). These two sentences create an interesting paradox. On the one hand, the
court is saying that there is the possibility of a reasonable expectation of privacy. On
the other hand, if the activity can be seen, the expectation is not reasonable. Thus,
if the activity is never observed, one has a reasonable expectation of privacy, but
need never claim it. If however, the activity is observed, resulting in arrest, one would
not be allowed to claim an expectation of privacy. See also, United States v. Allen,
675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that appellants had no reasonable expectation
of privacy from aerial surveillance using sense-enhancing devices such as binoculors
and telephoto lenses).
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only reasonable measures most people could take to maintain their privacy
would be to screen their property from ground level view, the Court is
denying fourth amendment protection to the vast majority.
In effect, the Court seems to be taking the doctrine introduced in
Oliver, that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields as
a matter of law, and extending it to aerial observation of the curtilage,
creating a different standard of protection for the curtilage when it is viewed
from the air than when it is viewed.from the ground, finding that whatever
is in "plain view" has no fourth amendment protection.
The issue of what constitutes "plain view" is left unresolved, whether
sophisticated surveillance technology may be used, how sophisticated it may
be, and under what circumstances it may be used. Apparently, the Court
has created a dichotomy between commercial and private property with
regard to the degree of technological sophistication that may be employed
in aerial surveillance, allowing more intrusive observation of commercial
06
property than of private property.'
In Dow, the Court narrowed the definition of curtilage, and increased
the areas in which it would consider expectations of privacy to be pres07
umptively unreasonable.
These two cases evidence a significant retreat from the case-by-case
analysis of the reasonableness of expectations of privacy set out in Katz,
and a significant narrowing of the scope of the protection offered by the
fourth amendment.
WILLIAM

H. SATTLER

106. See supra notes 84-85.
107. See generally Note, Leading Cases: ConstitutionalLaw, 100 HAav. L.
REv. 100, 141-43 (1986).
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